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Abstract—Sharing of radio spectrum requires a careful and
nuanced understanding of the rights of incumbents and spectrum
entrants. In addition, the dynamics of stakeholders can be
understood by examining how various rights are arranged (and
rearranged) among them. Importantly, understanding the rights
and their distribution is the predicate to developing rational and
useful enforcement approaches.
In this paper, we show that spectrum sharing involves a
rearrangement of the rights associated with radio spectrum
among stakeholders. We show how this rearrangement of rights
implies the definition of new bundles of rights, appropriate to
each particular sharing scenario. We discover these rights – and
their (re)arrangement) – by examining several cases of spectrum
use. We begin with the rights associated with exclusive use
and proceed to consider rights arrangement in commons and
different spectrum sharing configurations. Further, in the case
of commons, we explicitly examine how governance of commons
can affect the rights distribution in spectrum. In each case, the
bundles of rights associated with each stakeholder changes.
New bundles of rights have consequences, not only on the
behavior of spectrum users but also on the enforcement process.
Our examination of the bundles of rights shows that each
rearrangement results in different approaches to enforcement.
We demonstrate this by revisiting enforcement in the cases we
examine.
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Spectrum sharing inevitably leads to interference. This
means that both spectrum incumbents and entrants will feel
the need to develop enforcement mechanisms to manage in-
terference [1]. Rational choices about enforcement approaches
and costs require analysis of rights, objectives, precision, etc.
[2] as well as metaphor [3]. Further, what is in question is a
possibly complex bundle of rights [4].
We have informally observed that spectrum sharing does
not fall neatly into one or the other of the cooperative–
non-cooperative sharing dichotomy typically offered in the
literature (see, for example, [5], [6]). This is consistent with
number of studies of radio sharing and the resolution of
interference [4], [7], [8], even though these authors have
different theoretical views. In each of the examined cases,
spectrum sharing was resolved through private action rather
than through legal means.
Authors such as Demsetz [9] and Coase [10] would argue
that the rights to use and to interfere emerge from either de
facto or de jure property rights and would, in the absence
of transaction costs, be acquired by the organization or use
that can put those rights to the highest social use. Smith [2]
argues that various forms of governance are possible on the
continuum between exclusion and commons.
To better understand what rights are in question and how
they are bundled and (ultimately) enforced, we examine two
general cases of spectrum sharing. First, we consider usage
rights in the ISM band and their distribution via examples on
three different scenarios: a US university campus, airports and
a particular geographic area. In the second case, we contrast
the dynamics of the voluntary sharing in WiFi with the de
jure sharing being proposed by the US National Telecom-
munications and Information Agency (NTIA); in particular,
we consider sharing in the 1695-1710 and 3550 - 3650 MHz
bands.
II. SPECTRUM RELATED RIGHTS
Property rights associated with electromagnetic spectrum
were first proposed by Coase [11], though it took many
years for these notions to be incorporated, even partially, into
government policy. In short, Coase pointed out that the most
efficient way to assign spectrum is to give it to those users who
value it the most through property-like rights and secondary
markets. Fishman [12] argues that property rights are in fact
a bundle of specific rights: “[property rights] imply the ability
to buy; hold; use; sell; dispose of, in whole or in part; or
otherwise determine the status of an identifiable, separable and
discrete object, right or privilege.”
Faulhaber and Farber [13] discuss the idea of constructing
an appropriate bundle of rights to define property in spectrum.
The starting point for this is directly related to (and limited by)
the technical requirements affecting the exclusive usage rights.
The definition of spectrum rights begins with the exclusive
usage spectrum rights model. Toward that end, De Vany et.
al. [14] proposed a multidimensional set of rights called TAS,
which implies that “the owner of the TAS-based rights would
have the exclusive right to produce electromagnetic waves for
a specified period of time (T), over a specified geographic area
(A), and in a specified range of frequency (S).” TAS is said
to define an electrospace. Matheson and Morris [15] expand
this to a seven dimensional model, which includes frequency,
time, three dimensions of location (latitude, longitude, and
elevation) and two possible directions of arrival (azimuth and
elevation angles) and apply it in an attempt to define an
exclusive rights region. It is important to note that interference
and noise are stochastic processes, which vary with time and
location so that exclusion may not be complete. Thus, even if
spectrum rights are defined through one of these electrospace
models, unexpected interference and noise cannot be prevented
nor can the quality of the resource be guaranteed [16].
From a legal perspective, the definition of spectrum rights
starts with exclusive usage rights (in the US) because Section
303(f) of the Communication Act of 1934 requires the FCC
to prevent interference between stations. Because of this,
the FCC adopted the “command-and-control” approach to
spectrum management in hopes of making spectrum usage
more predictable. In the command-and-control approach, the
spectrum license bundles a group of rights in an electrospace,
including:
• rights to establish infrastructure
• rights to transmit
• rights to receive without interference
• rights to provide a particular type of services
This means that only licensees have the right to construct the
infrastructure, transmit in the frequency bands and provide
services as determined in the license. Other users have no
rights to do so in the same electrospace. Note that the right
to receive is different than the right to receive without inter-
ference. For example, receivers exist for NOAA’s METSAT
service (discussed later in this paper) that have the right to
receive, but are not guaranteed to receive without interference.
Similarly, users of automotive radar detectors have the right
to receive radar signals in most U.S. states, but this is not
guaranteed to be interference free, nor is it universal (e.g.,
Virginia has removed this right from its geographic territory).
Finally, AM broadcast receivers may receive signals from very
distant transmitters at night, but reception without interference
is not guaranteed for these propagation modes.
As demand for spectrum access has increased, it has become
increasingly difficult to identify new electrospace for both new
entrants and incumbents due, in part, to the exclusive usage
paradigm. As a consequence, the notion of spectrum shar-
ing has been introduced in spectrum management. Spectrum
sharing breaks and rearranges the existing spectrum rights
bundle, and reassigns rights to different parties. For instance,
the spectrum license no longer bundles spectrum rights with
the right to establish infrastructure, right to transmit, right to
provide services, etc. In other words, licensees are not the
only party to operate in that electrospace. Unlicensed users
or secondary users (depending on different spectrum models)
also have the right to build infrastructure, transmit, and provide
services. Furthermore, with the liberalization of spectrum,
unlicensed and secondary users may not be limited to provide
services specific to the spectrum license (i.e., secondary users
in TV bands are free to provide broadband services in the
White Spaces).
Spectrum virtualization, which is an emerging approach
for spectrum management and usage, promises to rearrange
spectrum rights even further [17], [18]. One of the ultimate
goals for spectrum virtualization is for spectrum users to
utilize any idle frequency and transmit signals using the most
appropriate technologies and devices. That means spectrum
users may share spectrum, devices, and their devices are
programmable to support different types of services. In this
case, there may emerge infrastructure providers that transmit
signals, spectrum licensees that lease spectrum to other users,
service providers that offer innovative applications and deal
with customer relationships, etc.
Notably, with the implementation of spectrum sharing, other
types of spectrum rights arise. First, we can identify the right
to underlay, which may be granted to secondary users in order
to allow devices to operate under the primary users’ noise
floor. Ultra Wide Band (UWB) is an example in spectrum
underlay. A second type of right would be the right to overlay,
which permits secondary users to transmit in licensed bands
above the noise floor, presumably without interfering with the
license holder. These two types of rights define the operation
and also enforcement requirements in these new modes of
spectrum use.
It may be useful to consider other rights as well. For exam-
ple, by focussing on the spectrum operating environment rather
than on user protection, De Vries and Sieh propose reception
rights, comprised of probabilistic reception protections and
transmission permissions to define spectrum operation rights
[19]. Further, Weiss and Cui propose interference rights [20].
The interference rights explicitly allow secondary users to
interfere with existing services offered by a primary user to
a certain level. Licensees can write interference rights under
their license, which can be traded, combined, or exchanged
with other users. Ofcom developed the notion of spectrum
usage rights, which specify the emissions that a license holder
may transmit in neighboring bands or locations, instead of
specifying a transmission power cap for each transmitter [21].
In the above analysis, we only consider rights that are
directly related to spectrum operations. The rights regime
gets even more complicated when we consider commons and
Coasian negotiation. In spectrum commons, like the WiFi
band, a particular asset is made available for the use of all,
with common restrictions that govern the corresponding usage
restrictions for all [13]. Thus, all spectrum users have equal
rights in terms of spectrum usage and are not entitled to
protection from interference. However, when spectrum users
get involved in disputes derived from spectrum usage and
interference, rights such as local authority and land ownership
may influence the rights that are directly related to spectrum
operations.
When spectrum sharing happens under Coasian negotiation,
rights associated with spectrum utilization are totally or par-
tially exchanged among parties. According to Demsetz, “A
bundle of rights often attaches to a physical commodity or
service, but it is the value of the rights that determines the
value of what is exchanged [9].” So, the rights that have been
exchanged determine the spectrum trading price.
In addition to framing property rights with a specific
spectrum sharing model, Faulhaber and Farber [13] add a
further notion of economic efficiency to the definition of the
bundle of rights. These authors state that for the bundle to
be meaningful,“the scope of property must be economically
viable in order to avoid the tragedy of the anticommons. But
it must not be so large as to encourage market dominance.” In
other words, even if an initial perfect definition of the bundle
of rights is not necessary, it should be carefully performed so
that it allows for future transactions and private contracts to
remedy any preliminary mistakes.
The discussion above suggests that this bundle of rights is
both richer than previously thought and dynamic. Figure 1 is
a collection of the rights identified here and how they change
under different spectrum management regimes; we make no
claim that it is complete.
An important factor that needs to be addressed in the
definition of this bundle of rights (or any property rights
regime) is how well it permits these rights to evolve with tech-
nology [13]. Following this idea and our previous discussion,
there are many circumstances that could be used to illustrate
different compositions and complexities of bundles of rights.
Our main purpose in this paper is to portray how spectrum
rights are restructured in spectrum sharing scenarios and how
this affects enforcement. In this context, we present examples
of spectrum sharing in the ISM band (presumably under a
spectrum commons model) and cooperative spectrum sharing
which includes de jure sharing and private negotiation.
After analyzing spectrum rights in each of our selected
scenarios, we shall consider how the particulars of each situa-
tion impact the development of enforcement mechanisms and
strategies. Intuition might tell us that a general enforcement
framework would not be suitable or not likely to be developed.
Similarities will exist; however, each particular situation will
rely on its own enforcement guidelines.
III. COMMONS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ISM BANDS
In this paper, we focus on sharing in the ISM bands,
given that it is commercially popular and there is a large
literature on this topic. Nonetheless, we would like to start our
discussion with the (historically) first approach to this shared
use of spectrum, namely Amateur Radio Service (ARS). This
particular case results rather interesting as it appears as a
“hybrid” of licensed use and the commons. Users who are
interested in accessing one of the twenty-six bands allocated
for amateur radio need to obtain a license from the FCC (i.e.,
they need to pass an exam to prove their eligibility before they
are granted a license). Once licensed, users need to coordinate
their access to the spectrum with others by selecting the
appropriate transmitting channels given that frequencies are
not assigned for exclusive use of any station. Additionally,
through cooperation, users need to ensure efficient spectrum
usage.1 This type of spectrum utilization may be construed as a
type of “private commons” because membership is controlled
through the operator license, amateur radios must not cause
1See http://www.ecfr.gov Title 47, Part 97 on Amateur Radio Service
harmful interference to other radio communications or signals,
and they must accept interference from other licensed users.
In other words, they are not entitled to interference protection,
just as is the case of the ISM bands. In situations when
harmful interference with licensed users is detected and cannot
be prevented, amateur radio transmissions are restricted to
specific time slots when this harm is nullified or at least
minimized. In summary, users of the amateur radio service
will have the right to deploy the infrastructure, the right to
transmit, the right to receive (but not the right to receive
without interference). Note that no license is required for the
right to receive.
A less restrictive commons can be found in the various
“Personal Radio Services” (e.g., Citizen’s Band) authorized by
the FCC2. The PRSs generally bundle licenses with equipment
that complies with the technical regulations and require users
to work out interference amongst themselves; of course, the
FCC is the ultimate arbiter of any disputes. These rights are
very similar to the rights users have in the ISM bands, which
will be illustrated below.
WiFi is one of the most popular technologies to use the
commons form of spectrum management. WiFi uses a link
layer protocol that embodies a spectrum etiquette to facilitate
fairness in sharing [22]. In this paper, we are interested in
a different aspect of WiFi and spectrum sharing: that of a
de facto hierarchy of rights that can be analyzed through the
lens of Coase and Smith. To illustrate the existence of these
hierarchies of rights, we point out several examples in different
environments and the objectives that drive their formulation.
A. Spectrum sharing in University campuses
Although the ISM bands operate on a license free basis,
institutions often assert rights connected with these bands.
Such assertions may or may not be justified unter the FCC’s
OTARD (Over the Air Devices) rules3. At the University of
Pittsburgh, the central computing and networking unit does
not permit the unauthorized use of these bands. Under the
Wireless Network Standards, it says
In order to prevent problems caused by radio
interference, to ensure the integrity of University
resources, and to ensure the widest availability of
reliable wireless networking services, the University
shall remain the sole owner of all unlicensed spec-
trums [sic] of radio frequencies available for use on
any of its campuses and related properties.4
The target of this ban is generally not low power devices, such
as those using Bluetooth, but higher power devices such as
WiFi access points. Interviews with engineers and administra-
tors reveal that they wish to control the user experience when
they are connected wirelessly to the greatest extent possible,
and that they want to ensure that wireless communications are
secured according to the standards of the organization. The
2U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 47, Part 95
3See 47 C.F.R. §1.4000
4http://technology.pitt.edu/network-web/responsibilities/wireless-network-
standard.html, downloaded on 4 November 2013
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Fig. 1. Bundles of spectrum rights
University of Pittsburgh is not alone in this policy; a brief
survey of public and private universities showed that similar
policies were widespread.
But university administrators must tread carefully. In 2004,
the University of Texas at Dallas tried to restrict students
from using personal wireless networks in student residences.
UT-Dallas wireless service coverage extended throughout its
campus, including students’ residences. However, many stu-
dents living in these residences opted to pay for service
with local providers and share it with their room mates via
private wireless networks. As mentioned by the University’s
Executive Director of Information Resources, these private
access points were interfering with the use of the university’s
wireless network, at times even preventing people from signing
in to the official network. It was additionally stated that such
interference is unfair to other residents, and students who
cannot afford to pay for an external internet service should
have the right to use the university’s network free of charge.
UT-Dallas officials modified their position when they learned
that the FCC OTARD rules for landlords prohibiting wireless
use of their lessees, including the use and installation of
wireless access points were unlawful [23]. After this, UT-
Dallas reversed the ban on private wireless use in certain
student residences 5.
B. Dispute between Logan airport and Continental Airlines
In 2005, Logan International Airport in Boston tried to
block Continental Airlines from providing free WiFi service,
5See http://www.utwatch.org/oldnews/fwst-wifi-9-22-04.html and
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/powerpoint/SWR0548.pps
a service which the airport charged a fee of $7.95. The argu-
ments provided by the airport included that Continental’s WiFi
service interfered with other wireless devices and represented
a threat to security. Continental rejected this claim and argued
that Logan authorities could not legally ban their services since
the latter were consistent with FCC regulations [24].
FCC sided with Continental Airlines since WiFi is an unli-
censed service, no WiFi operator is entitled to receive protec-
tion against harmful interference from other WiFi operations
[25]. The FCC cited its established OTARD rules that allow
tenants to install and operate their own small antennas under
certain circumstances. FCC decided that WiFi hubs/antennas
are also covered under these rules. Consequently, the FCC
has ruled that tenants are allowed to install their own WiFi
networks within their own leased spaces 6.
C. Resolving Interference among WISPs
Sandvig [8] provides examples of two cases in which
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) encountered con-
flicting use of the ISM band. In general, unlicensed bands
constitute an appealing option for the deployment of broad-
band service in areas where it has not been provided yet.
These areas are normally small in population and located
in rural environments outside of the range of coverage of
large telecommunications carriers. It is in this situations that
small local service providers make business plans in order to
bring broadband services to these unattended areas. Since local
service providers cannot afford an exclusive license, at least
not to the full extent of their services, they take advantage
6http://www.ibls.com/internet-law-news-portal-view.aspx?s=latestnews-
id=1632
of the existing unlicensed spectrum in order to deploy their
service infrastructure. A case study presented in [8] shows the
possible outcomes of such a situation in a given geographical
area.
This example presents Planetree Forest, an area composed
of fifty-four small towns, where only dial-up Internet access
was available at the time of the case. In response, a firm
providing high-speed service, TownNet, was deployed using
unlicensed spectrum. A second firm, SATNet, which had
previously been providing services in adjacent areas, decided
to enter then market in Planetree as well, also making use
of license-exempt bands. Since both service providers were
operating upon the same spectrum in overlapping geographical
areas, coordination of spectrum use was needed. At first the
two firms negotiated which channels each firm should use in
order to avoid interference. As it turned out, the agreement
was not always kept; this is not surprising since the firms
were competing with each other as well. In the specific case
of Planetree, it was not clearly determined what mechanism
SATNet was utilizing to interfere with TownNet, but the
outcome was that TownNet subscribers had no Internet service,
even indoors. The municipal government and other external
members intervened with a goal of settling the disputes.
Even after the parties reached an agreement on the specific
channel TownNet would be allowed to use, SATNet demanded
payments for reconfiguring the integrity of their network in
order to comply with the new requirements. The dispute
between these two service providers came to an end but for
entirely different reasons. It turns out that both entities had
been providing services with uncertified equipment which was
interfering with an adjacent licensed band.
D. Discussion
As stated in Section II, the spectrum rights mentioned
by prior research mainly consider spectrum related rights.
In the unlicensed bands that use commons-based spectrum
management, and also in the particular case of amateur radios,
spectrum users have equal rights in deploying devices and
transmitting as long as they comply with the FCC’s rules.
However, the three cases above show that these spectrum rights
alone do not determine spectrum usage rights. Specifically,
although certified devices such as private routers are legally
allowed to operate in unlicensed bands, the rights to manage
this spectrum when operating in specific environments, such
as universities, may be “acquired”. In the case of universities,
the restrictions are designed to maximize social benefits (at
least this is claimed).
It might be expected that condominium owners or apartment
dwellers would explicitly coordinate WiFi sharing with each
other to maximize net throughput (despite OTARD rules);
however, no examples of this could be found. Instead, some
end users leave WiFi for cable-based Ethernet when con-
gestion becomes severe, while others use channel scanning
software to identify those channels that would interfere least.
In still other cases, owner’s associations or landlords might
“acquire” rights by offering WiFi service to their tenants at
zero price. Such an offering would allow for centralized man-
agement/optimization of WiFi for the community of tenants. In
the Williamson’s framework [26], this could also be considered
an example of “hierarchy” (or central coordination) when the
transaction costs are too high.
As observed, this bundle of rights in spectrum commons
includes the rights to establish infrastructure, the right to
transmit and receive according to FCC’s rules, the right to
transmit and receive as recommend by technical standards,
other rights such as land ownership rights and local authorities,
etc. From a Coasian point of view, the computing and network-
ing department of the university has acquired the collection
of rights associated with the ISM bands (by fiat in this case),
since it is more valuable for the university than for individuals
and departments.
The limited transmission power cap in the unlicensed ISM
bands is meant to keep interference and collisions at an accept-
able level. However, these ex ante rules alone cannot provide a
harmonized spectrum environment due to the intensive usage
of these bands. As Sandvig stated in his paper “when legal
constraints are removed, users make their own order and are
bound by their own local and differing standards of fairness
and propriety.” In this case, although ISM bands have legal
constraints, they are not enough for efficient usage. Therefore,
cooperation among unlicensed users, beyond the rights that
are determined by the FCC, are needed for achieving a better
QoS.
The IEEE 802.11 group took the first step in mandating
devices to sense the carrier before operation (“Listen-before-
talk”) in order to reduce interference and collisions. The IEEE
802.11 standard is a technical cooperation among unlicensed
users. It harmonizes the spectrum usage environment, ensures
fairness and eventually improves system performance [22].
Similar standards include, but are not limited to Bluetooth,
Zigbee, etc. The major advantage provided by standards (tech-
nical cooperation) is avoiding transaction costs in negotiation.
When the transaction cost is zero, unlicensed users may be
able to agree on a spectrum sharing etiquette that achieves
the highest mutual benefit which is better than technical
cooperation. Unfortunately, negotiation is not free and this cost
quickly rises as the number of parties increase. In this case,
standards provide a simple and cost effective solution.
The shortcoming of standards is that they assume all users
are homogeneous. It is true if by “users” we mean different
devices. However, it is not true if “users” represent parties that
own and provide services with different devices. Moreover,
these parties may have hierarchical authorities and may own
different rights in certain locations that impact spectrum usage.
For instance, the FCC ruled that Continental Airlines had
the right to provide WiFi services in their rented space, not
because Logan Airport and Continental Airlines had different
spectrum usage rights in that location but due to the land
ownership factor. This also applies to the university case.
Students have the right to establish private WiFi in their
dorm, since they rent or lease their dorm rooms. Nevertheless,
they are not allowed to provide WiFi services in department
buildings or even in the hallways.
Deciding which party has the right to use the spectrum
depending on the ownership of the land does not end the battle.
In the third example, neither of the firms owns/leases/rents
the land, and both of them provide similar services. Further,
electromagnetic waves travel through geographic boundaries.
Except in cases where usage is low, local coordination in
such situations is unavoidable. Additionally, local authority
intervention would be required in case there are problems that
coordination alone cannot solve. In this manner, this would
represent a manual means of determining the geographic
area, timeslots and channels that each company can use for
transmitting.
Despite DeVries’s advocacy for other metaphors [3], let
us use the spatial metaphor of spectrum to help readers
better understand the bundle of rights in spectrum commons.
Suppose land is mutually owned and every person in the region
has the right to hunt, plant, mine, etc. If each right holder (a
person in this case) seeks to maximize his right, he will over
hunt and it may lead to the “tragedy of commons”. When the
negotiation cost is zero, every member of the community can
agree to curtail the rate at which they hunt. However, the cost
of reaching such an agreement is not zero. Hence, a standard
will be deployed and determine the portion of land over which
each person can hunt. This standard may not necessarily lead
to the optimum solution to the entire community since some of
the families may not hunt and others’ living may fully rely on
hunting. As a result, the community may choose to “govern”
these usage rights [2]. Families that rely on hunting may get a
larger quota on hunting while surrendering other rights such as
planting and mining. Furthermore, this local authority would
play an important role in enforcement [9].
IV. COOPERATIVE SHARING
Compared with commons, cooperative sharing implies hi-
erarchical rights among spectrum users. Primary users have
higher priority in using the frequency and secondary users
coordinate with primary users in order to operate in the
band. Depending on the motivation, there are two types of
cooperative sharing, de jure cooperative sharing and private
negotiation.
Cooperative 
Spectrum sharing
Private NegotiationDe Jure
Federal-
Commercial
TV White Space Spectrum Trading
Mobile Virtual 
Network Operators
Fig. 2. Cooperative Sharing.
A. De Jure cooperative sharing
De jure cooperative sharing describes situations of mandated
sharing. We will examine two cases of this kind of sharing:
TV white space (TVWS) and commercial-federal spectrum
sharing. In this case, regulators (notably the FCC and the
NTIA) require TV license holders and federal users (such
as radar) to share radio spectrum with commercial users.
Secondary users do not need to pay for using the spectrum,
but they have to follow rules determined by regulators and
primary users.
1) TV White Space: In 2008, the FCC released the Second
Report and Order to allow unlicensed devices to transmit in
the broadcast television spectrum at locations where licensed
services are absent. The difference between TVWS and ISM
bands is that unlicensed users in TVWS are required to
cooperate with primary users first and then share with each
other. That is, the secondary user rights (in general) are
subordinate to the primary users, but not to other secondary
users.
The key requirements for secondary users in the TVWS
include: (1) all devices (except personal/portable devices op-
erating in client mode), must have geolocation capabilities and
access the database to obtain a list of the permitted channels
before transmission; (2) devices that do not have geolocation
capabilities and cannot access the database must have the
capability to sense TV broadcasting and wireless microphone
signals, at levels as low as -114 dBm, and they are subject to
lower transmission power limit; (3) all devices must provide
identifying information to the database for enforcement pur-
poses, and they are subject to equipment certification by the
FCC Laboratory before implementation. The power limit for
a 6 MHz channel is: fixed 30 dBm (1 Watt); personal/portable
16 dBm (40 dW); sensing only 17 dBm (50 mW); all other
personal/portable 20 dBm (100 mW).
TV stations are not the only primary users in TVWS,
microphone users are also primary users of this same band.
Due to the nomadic usage of microphone and its low trans-
mission power, the TVWS database requires them to register
on the database before operation in order to get interference
protection.
2) Federal-Commercial spectrum sharing: Sharing be-
tween the government incumbents and commercial users is
one of the key forms of spectrum sharing recommended by the
NTIA and the FCC. The target frequency bands include 1695-
1710 MHz, 1775-1780 MHz, 3500-3650 MHz, 4200-4220
MHz, and 4380-4400 MHz. In these bands, primary users’
applications can be fixed, portable, or mobile. We provide
two demonstrative examples in this paper: 1695-1710 MHz
and 3500-3650 MHz, which are drawn from [27].
The 15 MHz available for sharing in the 1695-1710 MHz
band have as a primary user the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) wich is in charge of weather
satellite receive earth stations (Meteorological-Satellite). The
target secondary users for this particular case are commercial
LTE operators who will be using this band for uplink com-
munications from users’ handsets to base stations.
The second example in federal-commercial sharing is found
in the 3550 - 3650 MHz band, which is used by the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) radar systems with installations on
land, ships and aircrafts. The secondary users are envisioned as
small cell systems such as femtocells, picocells or additional
methods that work as extensions of macrocell systems. The
behavior of the primary users in this case is harder to predict
than that of the previous example. In several cases, radars
are used for military purposes, thus their spectrum usage
characteristics are not disclosed; in other situations, radars are
used for emergency systems and thus need a higher degree
of spectrum availability and protection from interference. A
multi-tiered shared access model is proposed for this band. In
this manner, it would be managed by an Spectrum Access
System (SAS). This method aims at deploying sufficient
interference protection mechanisms for the incumbents in
the form of “access tiers” and, consequently, exclusion and
protection zones that would limit the access of secondary users
to the spectrum to a level that would minimize harm to the
incumbents’ transmissions.
B. Private negotiation
In private negotiation, primary and secondary users nego-
tiate spectrum sharing etiquette, in terms of leasing price,
location, coverage, transmission power or interference level,
frequency, operation duration, etc. Negotiation happens in
private markets with or without brokers. Secondary users will
obtain operation flexibility at the expense of a certain spectrum
leasing price.
1) Spectrum Trading: The FCC released the first Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
facilitate spectrum access though the use of spectrum leasing
agreement in 2003. It allows primary users to lease some
or all of the spectrum usage rights associated with their
licenses to third parties. These leasing agreements need to
be submitted to the FCC at least 10 or 21 days (depending
on the leasing duration) prior to their effective date. The
second Report and Order provides immediate processing, such
as overnight approval, for certain qualifying spectrum leasing
arrangements.
According to the FCC’s definition, there are two types of
spectrum leasing arrangements: spectrum manager lease and
de facto transfer lease. Under the former option, both de jure
and de facto control over the leased spectrum are retained
by licensees during the leasing period. In the latter option,
lesees obtain the de facto control of the leased spectrum
while primary users keep the de jure control over it. In both
cases, spectrum leasing is further divided into two classes: a
short-term lease, limited to one year; and a long-term lease
lasting more than one year. Consequently, spectrum entrants
can either follow a sharing etiquette determined by primary
users or define their own sharing etiquette, based on the leasing
arrangements.
2) Mobile Virtual Network Operators: ITU defined Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) as operators that offer
mobile services to end users without a governmental license.
Indeed, MVNOs have access to radio elements of one or
more mobile operators in order to offer services to subscribers.
These radio elements include radio transmission links, control
and mobility management functions that locate and deliver
services to end users. MVNOs accounted for 7% of subscribers
in Western Europe and North America in 2003, and this
number increased to over 9% at the end of June 2009 7.
Unlike other spectrum sharing frameworks, MVNOs do not
directly operate on the spectrum resource. They rely on Mobile
Network Operators (MNOs)’s base stations to transmit and
receive wireless signals. There are several types of MVNOs,
depending on their infrastructure and agreements. A MVNO
can establish everything except radio access and transmission,
or it may only focus on marketing and branding. The former
type is capable of handling network routing and may have
roaming agreements with other MNOs. They are able to
produce and distribute voice and data traffic, as well as SMS
and MMS messages. The latter is only a wholesaler and
distributor of voice and data traffic.
MVNO is an option for wireless service providers to enter
into the market in a cooperative way. The major advantage of
MVNOs is mainly derived from the low barrier for entering
the wireless service industry. They do not need to take part in
the time-consuming spectrum licensing procedures nor spend
a tremendous amount of money on infrastructure. However,
the main disadvantage also stems from this merit. This type
of sharing requires the radio access technology, adopted by
spectrum entrants, to be compatible with the existing primary
users’ infrastructure. One further constraint that may appear
agreement-wise relies on the fact that primary users may not
be interested in enforcement in MVNO since they control the
traffic; however, MVNOs may want to ensure the fulfillment
of agreements.
C. Discussion
1) De jure vs. Private negotiation: De jure and private
negotiation has been studied in [28]. In our case, we consider
the differences in the incentive for sharing. TVWS and federal-
commercial sharing are mandated by regulators. It is generally
accepted that spectrum sharing mechanisms will increase over-
all spectrum utilization; nevertheless, this does not necessarily
imply that the incumbents’ utility is improved, especially
for de jure sharing. In private negotiation, incumbents only
share spectrum with secondary users when it is profitable to
do so. They may even enhance their own infrastructure and
compliant technologies in order to increase the amount of
leasable spectrum. This is not necessarily the case in de jure
sharing.
Due to this difference, incumbents in de jure and private
negotiation could be expected to exhibit different behav-
iors. For example, when prompted to share spectrum by a
higher authority, primary users should exhibit a tendency to
maximize their interference protection measures since they
cannot appropriate benefits from an increased probability of
interference. This method of protection can emerge as they
demand a clear and explicit definition of spectrum rights.
Primary users, such as TV stations, microphone, radar and
7http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/newslog/MVNO-Market-To-Double-In-Four-
Years-Driven-By-Emerging-Markets.aspx
weather satellite systems make efforts in order to hold on to
as many of the rights they enjoyed prior to the sharing mandate
as possible. As an example, TV stations and microphone users
are supported by a geolocation database that is designed to
prevent secondary users from interfering with existing opera-
tions. Similarly, radar, weather satellite systems, and military
transmitters request significant exclusion and protection zones.
These actions illustrate the efforts of the incumbents to protect
and guarantee the consistency of their services after their
spectrum is offered for sharing. Incumbents appear to be aware
that once spectrum is open for sharing it would be difficult
(and costly) to regain the prior bundle of rights. If incumbents
can benefit from sharing through negotiation, we would expect
a tolerance for weaker rights definition and a willingness to
rebundle and reassign rights.
In private negotiation, not only incumbents voluntarily
share their spectrum but they may also receive a monetary
compensation for this transaction. As Demsetz [9] writes, “A
bundle of rights often attaches to a physical commodity or
service, but it is the value of the rights that determines the
value of what is exchanged.” In private negotiation several
situations may arise: for instance, primary users can require
secondary users to follow a specific sharing etiquette; they may
authorize secondary users to use the spectrum as desired under
the license terms, or they can even transfer the de facto rights
of spectrum usage to secondary users. Clearly, the (monetary)
value of the spectrum lease will be directly proportional to the
magnitude of the bundle of rights that the primary users are
willing to grant to the spectrum entrants or secondary users.
2) Difference in applications and primary users: Applica-
tions and primary users also make a difference in spectrum
usage. Let us start with de jure sharing in TVWS. TV stations
provide fixed services with high transmission power, while
microphone is mostly nomadic and unpredictable with low
transmission power. In this case, TV signals are easier for
secondary users to detect and predict. If the sensing capability
of secondary users is required to be based on microphone sig-
nal detection, it will increase the operation cost for secondary
users and, in consequence, decrease the spectrum utilization.
However, if the sensing capability requirements are based on a
TV signal detection floor, secondary users may interfere with
microphone services. Current regulation requires microphone
usage to register in a database in order to get protection.
In the case above, although incumbents have different
services, all of them are civil services. In federal-commercial
sharing bands, there are civil and military services. It is
believed that military services are more critical and require
higher privacy measures. In contrast, weather satellite commu-
nication is open to the public. Thus, the enforcement method
will be particular to each case and will be discussed in Section
V-B
In private negotiation, secondary users who obtain spectrum
leases from spectrum trading have their own infrastructure,
while MVNOs use, at least, primary users’ access networks.
In other words, primary users have more control over MVNOs’
service than spectrum leasing through trading. Consequently,
primary users may not have the incentive to enforce MVNO
usage, but MVNOs may want to monitor the actual usage. In
contrast, primary users may want to enforce the transmission
parameters of cooperative secondary users to make sure that
the contract agreements are met.
V. ENFORCEMENT
Demsetz [9] indicates that property rights determine how
people may be benefited and harmed. They facilitate the
coordination of actions across parties by specifying what usage
rights and responsibilities different economic actors have with
respect to goods and services exchanged in the economy.
He further argues that enforcement is a key component of
any property rights regime, since enforcement makes property
rights more practical. Additionally, enforcement helps building
trust among primary and secondary users. In this light, it is
intuitive that the rearrangement of the bundles of rights that
we presented in the previous sections will have an important
influence on the deployment of enforcement techniques. In
other words, enforcement techniques should adapt to new shar-
ing situations and take into account the rights and obligations
of the involved parties (i.e., primary and secondary users,
spectrum sellers and buyers, users with the same rights to
access unlicensed spectrum).
Our objective in this section is to analyze how enforcement
may be carried out under different circumstances that arise
when we consider various spectrum sharing scenarios. We
will start with a brief description of the general aspects of
enforcement and then delve into its key issues, which finally
brings us to the specifics of enforcement in the spectrum
sharing cases we have presented here.
A. Spectrum Enforcement in General
Shavell [29] points out three important aspects of an en-
forcement regime: (1) the timing of enforcement action (ex
ante or ex post); (2) the form of enforcement sanctions; and
(3) enforcement party.
Ex ante enforcement takes place before harmful events
happen. The purpose of ex ante enforcement is to provide
a prophylactic strategy for ensuring that unsafe technologies
and processes, which may result in undesirable performance,
are never applied. Mechanisms of ex ante enforcement include
licensing, certification, beacon signals, database systems, ex-
clusion and protection zones.
In contrast, ex post enforcement takes place after harmful
action has already occurred. It can use different types of
sanctions to deter harmful behavior, mainly via costs imposed
on the guilty party. The most challenging mechanism for ex
post enforcement is detection, which may use radio black
boxes and sensor networks.
Ex post enforcement techniques typically involve some kind
of adjudication and penalty. A monetary penalty is one type
of sanction. However, this type of penalty might not be the
most effective sanction in the spectrum sharing domain. Other
ex post enforcement sanctions may include the revocation of
licenses, fines, product recalls, or modifications to operating
rights. Woyach and Sahai [30] discuss the termination of
operation as an alternative sanction. It is evident that different
types of sanctions depend on the types of applications, device
limitations, detection methods, spectrum sharing mode, to
mention a few factors. Every situation must be evaluated
separately, as there is no universal sanction for all spectrum
sharing cases.
Another question that arises is who performs detection,
adjudication, etc. The options include voluntary (e.g. self-
regulation, self-enforcement) or compulsory (e.g., enforced by
third parties). Third parties might be regulatory authorities,
administrative courts, or general courts. Market players such
as primary users, secondary users, and spectrum brokers are
other candidates for third parties. Moreover, power may be
delegated to an industry enforcement bureau or agency. We
can also find situations in which hybrid compliance approaches
are applicable.
B. Enforcement in different sharing scenarios
In this section, we consider enforcement in the rights
regimes that emerge from the sharing scenarios we discussed
above. Included in this is a brief discussion about which
entities conduct enforcement, enforcement distinctions for
each right regime and enforcement techniques. It is clear that
due to the spectrum rights rearrangement, enforcement goals,
incentives and methods adjust accordingly.
1) Enforcement in exclusive use: In exclusive use, the real
estate metaphor for spectrum is perhaps most apt. As discussed
above, a spectrum license confers several rights, including the
right to transmit and the right to receive without interference.
Notably, traditional spectrum licenses often also limit the
services that the license holder may provide.
In this scenario, license holders would seek to “patrol” the
boundaries of their electrospace to ensure their right to receive
without interference. Spectrum managers (i.e., regulators) may
wish to “patrol” license holder behavior to ensure that the
requirements (and limitations) of the license are being met.
If the enforcement is focussed on regulatory rules, such
as license terms, the FCC has the statutory authority to
resolve complaints such as interference, tower registration,
equipment requirements, unauthorized construction or oper-
ation and compliance with operational provisions of licenses
(http://transition.fcc.gov/eb/sed/).
License holders are also interested in enforcement, since
their profits stem from providing services under the license
terms. Hazlett [4] shows that private action in resolving
interference complaints was significant in the early days of
radio. To reduce the cost (and time) associated with complaint
resolution, industry organizations have formed “frequency ad-
visory committees” (FACs) to collect and manage interference
complaints and, presumably, to attempt informal resolution8.
In a similar fashion, CTIA has a website to collect and perform
initial investigation on complaints related to the 800MHz
8http://www.fcc.gov/guides/private-land-mobile-interference-complaints
public safety band9. In each case, the FCC provides the
ultimate authority on interference complaints.
2) Enforcement in the spectrum commons: Nominally, en-
forcement is not a strong factor in the spectrum commons.
There is, after all, no right to receive without interference, so
“patrolling electrospace” does not make sense. But operations
in the commons is not without rules (e.g., spectrum etiquette
and power limits), so some enforcement may be appropriate.
Indeed, the FCC may adjudicate matters that stem from
equipment that does not comply with technical rules of shared
bands.
More generally, Smith [2] argues that governance of com-
mons could result in superior outcomes, so it is reasonable
that this would emerge in spectrum commons as well. Ex
ante measures of governance include explicit coordination of
frequency use, the “acquisition” of rights through means such
as ancillary rights (e.g., real estate), etc. Ex post governance
actions can include dispute resolution (such as case described
by Sandvig [8] and described above) and measures that are
derived from ancillary rights (University administrators may
require the removal of access points on non-rental spaces
despite the FCC’s OTARD rules.).
The institutional locus of this kind of governance is highly
dependent on the particular form of commons, its situation
and its governance. Governments can play a role (as shown
in [8]), as can property owners. It is equally plausible that a
self-governance system could emerge. An example of this is
found in the amateur radio community. As discussed above,
amateur radio enthusiasts have the right to build infrastructure,
the right to transmit in amateur frequencies, if they have
a license, and they have the right to receive (as do people
without amateur licenses), but not the right to receive without
interference. In this case, the Amateur Radio Relay League
(ARRL) attempts to provide ex ante interference management
through the National Frequency Coordinators’ Council 10. This
group has been sanctioned by the FCC to perform management
of amateur radio frequencies and they work with regional
frequency coordinators to establish management guidelines
and to perform initial ex post adjudication of interference
reports.
3) Enforcement in spectrum sharing: In many senses, ex-
clusive use and commons lie on opposing ends of a spectrum.
Between these extremes lie spectrum sharing and commons
with governance (briefly discussed in the previous section).
While governance solutions may not involve the creation of
enforceable rights, it can often mitigate some of the more
serious negative aspects of commons. Since spectrum sharing
implies a hierarchy of rights so questions of enforcement
become more complex.
a) De jure sharing: Spectrum sharing can be mandated
(de jure) or arrived at cooperatively (negotiated). In de jure
sharing, primary users (license holders) must share, perhaps
without explicit compensation. Since sharing is mandated, and
9http://www.publicsafety800mhzinterference.com/CTIAWeb/
10http://nfcc.us/
since primary users may not profit from the sharing, one would
expect them to be highly sensitive to interference of any kind.
In terms of the rights framework described above, incumbents
would seek to defend their right to receive without interference
while yielding ground on the rights to transmit and to establish
infrastructure.
An example of de jure spectrum sharing is described in
[31]. The U.S. National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), which manages federal government
spectrum in the U.S., has been asked to make spectrum avail-
able for commercial use. The NTIA has examined the 1695-
1710MHz band, which is currently assigned to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) Metero-
logical Satelitte (MetSat) downlinks. Because the sharing was
de jure, relocating the earth stations away from population
areas (to maximize the benefits of sharing) was not accepted as
a viable solution. In addition, initial ex ante measures included
large “exclusion zones” that protected the incumbents but
reduced the value to entrants; this was subsequently relaxed
to somewhat less restrictive “protection zones”. Enforcement,
in this case, was biased very heavily toward ex ante measures,
partly because the incumbents could not negotiate the terms
of sharing and also because no viable ex post adjudication
mechanism exists
b) Negotiated sharing: In negotiated sharing, secondary
users may pay a spectrum leasing fee to obtain the right
to operate on the (shared) spectrum and primary users may
sacrifice some of their own services (or service quality) in
order to get additional revenue from spectrum leasing fees.
Consequently, a goal of enforcement in this case is the
investment made by primary and secondary users. Secondary
users need to make sure that primary users do not operate the
same electrospace. Primary users may be interested in actual
QoS level rather than secondary users transmission terms. In
other words, it may not be a concern for primary users as long
as their services are not harmed by secondary users. Similarly,
spectrum entrants (secondary users) want to be sure that they
are able to use the electrospace they bargained for.
Spectrum sharing may also be for underlay rights. For
example, if the rights to interfere are determined as interfer-
ence temperature, which allows secondary users to operate as
long as the interference is under the interference temperature
threshold, then the enforcement entity should measure the
interference level and detect secondary users that violate
the threshold. On the contrary, if the rights to interfere are
determined by a spectrum leasing contract, both parties have
the incentive to enforce and the basis for enforcement is the
contract terms. In summary, entities that have the rights to
control and rights to use the spectrum have incentives to
enforce.
In negotiated sharing, the primary goal of enforcement for
the primary and secondary users is to make contracts effective.
Thus, both spectrum users have the incentive to monitor the
actual usage, since both primary and secondary users have the
incentive to violate spectrum leasing agreements in order to
obtain higher QoS. Regulatory bodies also have an interest in
enforcement, though they are likely to focus on the license
terms; i.e., it is not a concern for the regulator as long as the
license terms are not violated.
c) Locus of enforcement: While a regulator or govern-
mental entity might be considered the principal enforcement
agent, this solution does not seem to fit the negotiated sharing
scenario well. Bi-lateral mechanisms could be used to enforce
sharing agreements, though this does not scale particularly
well. Instead, one could imagine that third parties, such as
database providers and sensor network providers [32], might
offer enforcement services. Third party enforcement institu-
tions must be perceived as independent (for fairness) and
efficient if they are to emerge as a viable alternative.
C. Summary
Enforcement of rights in spectrum poses challenges as the
rights bundles change and become more complex. In this
section, we constructed a relationship between a changing
rights environment and the requirements of an enforcement
environment. This is necessary because, as pointed out by
Demsetz [9], rights are meaningless without enforcement. This
section is necessarily incomplete, since particular enforcement
approaches are highly situation-specific [27].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
As De Vries mentioned in [19], “conflict between operators
is due, in large part, to poorly defined rights, particularly across
boundaries between different service types.” In this paper, we
do not design spectrum rights, instead, we argue that spectrum
usage is actually determined by a bundle of rights rather than
just spectrum related rights. As an example, in the ISM bands
where all users have the rights to access the spectrum, whether
they can establish infrastructure and provide services depends
on whether they have the rights to use the land or not. Further,
we show that spectrum sharing involves a re-arrangement of
rights bundles across various stakeholders.
In this paper, we have proposed candidates that can be
included in the bundle of rights: rights to transmit and receive,
rights to receive without interference, rights to interfere, rights
to operate a specific service, spectrum usage right, spectrum
management right, underlay right, overlay right, etc. Addi-
tionally, we present more detailed rights that arise when we
consider specific situations and conflict-solving in spectrum
sharing. What we aimed to illustrate by providing a finer-
grained list of rights, is that the original bundle of rights that
was attached to the spectrum license has been “broken” and
further rearranged into more complex and specific bundles as a
consequence of the emergence of different models of spectrum
sharing.
As we could expect, this restructuring of the bundle of rights
is not an isolated factor; it has a significant influence on spec-
trum users’ behavior, spectrum trading and on enforcement.
Demsetz [9] indicates that enforcement is a key component of
the property rights regime, since it makes property rights more
practical. In other words, before enforcement occurs, parties
must have a clear notion of the types of rights they own.
Those rights might not be defined as precisely as it would
be desirable, but they surely need to be enforceable. From
the enforcement case studies that we have presented in this
work, it is clear that different rights affect users’ incentives
for performing enforcement and they are further related to the
benefit each party can obtain from developing the enforcement
activities. For instance, we have seen that in cases where
spectrum sharing is mandated, primary users have a higher
incentive to preserve their (higher priority) rights and perform
enforcement activities than secondary users; however, as the
latter get more financially involved in obtaining spectrum
(i.e., private negotiation) the incentives for taking part in
enforcement activities arise as there is a need to claim rights
that are appropriate to the level of investments incurred11.
After examining how bundles of rights vary under spec-
trum sharing schemes, we are able to briefly examine some
enforcement questions for each particular spectrum sharing
case. There are situations that appear to have similar enforce-
ment approaches; however, the characteristics of the parties
involved in the spectrum sharing models call for nuances that
differentiate one enforcement procedure from another. Thus,
our conclusion is consistent with [27], in that enforcement of
spectrum sharing is highly situation-specific. While this con-
clusion is somewhat generic, it is nonetheless satisfying that
the empirical approach of the previous papers are consistent
with the theoretical approach developed.
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